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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a framework for analyzing the risk of systems failure based on
estimating the failure probability. The latter is dened as the probability that a certain risk
process, characterizing the operations of a system, reaches a possibly time-dependent critical risk
level within a nite-time interval. Under general assumptions, we dene two dually connected
models for the risk process and derive explicit expressions for the failure probability and also the
joint probability of the time of the occurrence of failure and the excess of the risk process over the
risk level. We illustrate how these probabilistic models and results can be successfully applied in
several important areas of risk analysis among which are systems reliability, inventory management,
ood control via dam management, infectious disease spread and nancial insolvency. Numerical
illustrations are also presented.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Research on the probability of systems failure has attracted considerable attention in the risk analysis
literature in a variety of contexts, e.g., systems reliability analysis (Todinov 2006; Pate-Cornell and
Bea 1992), environmental risk management (Kolen et al. 2013; Serrano-Lombillo et al. 2011, etc.),
control of ood risk via dam management (Cox 2009; Kolen et al. 2013), managing inventory and
supply chain risk (see e.g. Resurreccion and Santos 2012), managing the risk of insolvency in the
nancial services industry. A recent contribution in the latter strand of literature is the paper by
Gerrard and Tsanakas (2011). Under the assumption of model parameter uncertainty, the authors
consider the static problem of setting insurance risk capital at a suciently high (threshold) level
so that the probability of the total insurance loss exceeding it equals a preassigned small value. In
an attempt to describe a more generic situation, the authors interpret this as nding a threshold
level which will not be exceeded by a certain risk factor with a predetermined large probability and
give two examples from environmental risk analysis, and supply chain risk management where similar
situations arise.
While we take inspiration from Gerrard and Tsanakas (2011), in this paper we depart from their
focus on parameter uncertainty and make one step further considering a dynamic loss process and
time-varying threshold. We address a more general problem of estimating the probability that a risk
factor will exceed a certain time-dependent threshold level and its inverse problem of nding a time-
dependent threshold level which will not be exceeded by the risk factor with a predetermined large
probability. More precisely, we assume that a system is characterized by two stochastic processes. One
process models the arrival and severity of some hazardous (critical) events that have negative impact
on the system, such as losses caused by system failures or catastrophic collapses. The second one
represents the risk mitigation process which involves actions aimed to keep the system operational,
such as ood preventive measures, supply of additional inventory to meet demand, capital injections
to ensure solvency, etc. It will be convenient for the time being to refer to the two processes as the
loss and the gain processes. The latter will be given specic interpretations in section 3, where we
demonstrate how the described general model ts particular real life risk analysis problems, e.g. in
dam management to mitigate ood risk, in systems reliability risk, in risk of emerging disease spread,
and in solvency risk in nancial systems. Under this risk framework, we will be concerned with the
event that the loss process hits the gain process from below leading to the failure of the whole system,
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and we will be particularly interested in the probability that such a failure event occurs within a
nite-time interval.
There are several areas of risk analysis where system failure problems arise and can be seen to
be covered by the generic risk model introduced above. However, more specically, depending on the
level of stochasticity embedded in the two processes, we will distinguish two versions of the model,
which we name the direct and inverse (or dual) risk models, coded as models A and B, respectively.
In model A, we assume that systems failures cause losses e.g. running records of ood level, nancial
liabilities or inventory management costs, which occur at some random instants in time within a xed
time horizon and consider the probability that the aggregate loss resulting from all failures will not
exceed the value of a time dependent critical threshold level, modelled by an arbitrary non-decreasing
function of time, allowing jumps in the threshold.
Alternatively, we will demonstrate that there are important risk analytic applications where it
is relevant to reverse the interpretation of the loss and gain processes in the direct risk model A,
formulated in detail in section 2.1. More precisely in the alternative, inverse model B, which is known
in the literature as the dual risk model, (see e.g.Asmussen and Albrecher 2010, Dimitrova et al.
2013b), it is assumed that gains (as opposed to losses in model A) which could be e.g., capital gains
or inventory replenishment quantities, are of random sizes and arrive at random moments in time,
while the cumulative loss (e.g. expense) outgo is modelled by a deterministic threshold function.
We consider the probability that the aggregate gain process will go bellow a time dependent critical
threshold level, thus causing failure.
The objective of this paper is two-fold. First, we mathematically formulate models A and B in
general terms and summarize existing theoretical results obtained under specic assumptions on the
probability of system failure within a nite time horizon, which is our primary focus in this paper. A
theoretical contribution is then made by deriving a new closed-form expression, given by Proposition
B.1, for the joint distribution of the failure time and the decit level in model A, under the more
general assumption of independent, non-identically Erlang distributed loss inter-arrival times (see
Appendix B). This expression is new and generalizes previous ruin probability results, obtained by
Ignatov and Kaishev (2004, 2012b) for the case of Poisson loss arrivals (see Appendix A). In the second
part of the paper, we demonstrate how our proposed models A and B, and the related probabilistic
results can be applied as risk analytic tools in various practical risk assessment situations. For the
purpose, we illustrate how to interpret the model parameters of our generic models A and B in order
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to reect the specics of the concrete practical risk assessment problems.
As a main illustrative risk analysis application, in section 3.1, we consider the control of ood risk
via managing the risk of dam overtopping. We propose a novel methodology which can aid decision
making on multiple water releases, based on the notion of alarm time at which ood warning alarms
signal the necessity of water releases. Further examples of risk analysis application of our risk models
and results include systems reliability, inventory management, infectious diseases spread and nancial
insolvency risk.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the assumptions and notations
underlying models A and B in more detail, and provide explicit expressions for the probability that
the whole system fails within a nite-time period. We also give an expression for the joint probability
of the time of the occurrence of failure and the decit in model A, a generalization of which is derived
in Appendix B. Section 3 is devoted to demonstrating how models A and B and the failure probability
results of section 2 can be applied to assess failure risk in systems reliability risk analysis, inventory
and supply chain risk management, control of ood risk via dam management, emerging disease spread
risk analysis and nancial and solvency risk management. Numerical illustrations are also presented
in this section. Section 4 provides further discussions on the possible extensions of the applications
of model A and B and some concluding remarks.
2 THE RISK MODELLING FRAMEWORK
2.1 Model A
Our generic risk model A is dened as follows. We assume that, as a result of faulty operation of a
system, losses, W1;W2; : : :, occur at random moments, T1; T2; : : :, following an appropriate stochastic
counting process, N(t), which counts the number of losses arriving until time t. Dierent models
for the arrival process, N(t) :=maxfi : Ti  tg, t > 0, could be adopted which could capture
non-stationarity and clustering in the arrival of losses. As a start, we will assume that N(t) is a
homogeneous Poisson process with intensity  > 0, i.e. with loss inter-arrival times 1 = T1; 2 =
T2   T1; 3 = T3   T2; : : :, identically, exponentially distributed random variables with parameter .
Let us note however that a more general setting of non-identical Erlang distributed inter-arrival times
is considered in Appendix B.
We will also assume that severities of individual losses are modelled by a sequence of positive
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continuous random variables, W1;W2; : : :, which are independent of the counting process, N(t). Let
Yi denote their partial sums, i.e. Yi = W1 + : : : + Wi, i = 1; 2; : : :, with a joint density function
f(y1; : : : ; yi). We denote by S(t) the total loss amount up to time t, i.e.
S(t) = YN(t) =
N(t)X
i=1
Wi; (1)
where we assume that S(t) = 0 if N(t) = 0. The total loss, S(t), can be viewed as a risk factor
whose value is non-decreasing in time. This is a reasonably general model for the total loss and
the occurrence and sizes of individual losses from failures. We note that a simpler version of the
model, assuming W1;W2; : : : are i.i.d, has been studied in the classical (insurance) risk theory (see
e.g. Asmussen and Albrecher 2010). The more general aggregate loss model (1) is better suited for
modelling dependence among the consecutive individual losses, which often is the case in real life risk
analytic applications as will be illustrated in the next sections.
In what follows, we will be interested in modelling the probability that, within a nite-time
interval [0; x], the total loss from the system's failures, S(t), would not exceed the gain process,
which is a certain time dependent critical threshold level, modelled by a non-decreasing non-negative
deterministic function, h(t) (note that h(0)  0 and if h(0) > 0, the latter can be interpreted as initial
surplus). Such an exceedance event, may be interpreted as the overall failure of the system which may
lead to its temporary or permanent inoperability. In fact, it may visually also be interpreted simply
as the loss trajectory hitting the critical upper bound, as illustrated in Figure 1. We denote by T ,
the time when S(t) exceeds h(t) for the rst time. Formally one can dene the random variable T
through the risk process
R(t) = h(t)  S(t); (2)
as
T := infft : t > 0; R(t) < 0g;
and the event of non-failure (overall survival) within the nite-time horizon [0; x] as fT > xg (i.e. the
random variable T takes value greater than x, including T =1 when failure never occurs or formally
when R(t)  0 for all t > 0). Alternatively, we will also refer to the event fT < xg as the failure
event.
Then, we can express the probability that the system does not fail, i.e. survives beyond time x,
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Figure 1: Model A. Left panel: h(t) (red/straight line) represents the deterministic upper critical level
and S(t) (blue/staircase line) is the stochastic loss process. Right panel: the risk process R(t).
as P (T > x). In a series of papers, (see Ignatov et al. 2001; Ignatov and Kaishev 2004; Dimitrova
et al. 2013a,b) the above mentioned risk model has been studied and the following explicit survival
probability formulae have been derived.
P (T > x) = e x

1 +
1X
k=1
k
Z h(x)
0
Z h(x)
y1
  
Z h(x)
yk 1
Ak(x; 1; : : : ; k) f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1

; (3)
where k = h
 1(yk), h 1(:) is the inverse function of h(t), and Ak(x; 1; : : : ; k)  Ak(x), k = 1; 2; : : :,
are the classical Appell polynomials of degree k with a coecient in front of xk equal to 1=k!, dened
by
A0(x) = 1;
A0k(x; 1; : : : ; k) = Ak 1(x; 1; : : : ; k 1);
Ak(k; 1; : : : ; k) = 0; k = 1; 2; : : : : (4)
Ecient algorithms for computing formula (3) with a prescribed accuracy have been proposed by
Dimitrova et al. (2013a), based on new recurrent expressions for the classical Appell polynomials. It
is worth mentioning that a version of formula (3) for the case of integer-valued losses, W1;W2; : : :, is
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also given in Dimitrova et al. (2013a), where further details on these explicit expressions for P (T > x)
and their numerical properties can be found.
It has to be emphasized that, mathematically, the setup in model A is very general. We assume
any non-negative non-decreasing gain function h(t) and arbitrarily distributed, possibly dependent,
loss severities Wi. We should note however, that the the assumptions on the stochastic nature of the
process S(t) and the deterministic function h(t) are specied at the initial time, t = 0. Both S(t) and
h(t) in practice would be estimated at time t = 0, based on historic data on the arrival times Ti, the
amounts Wi, i = 1; 2; : : : and the components of the deterministic cumulative gain h(t). Thus, risk
related decisions made at time zero would be static since they would not take into account the future
realizations of S(t) and h(t). At the same time, decision making can be made dynamic by splitting
the time horizon, x, into shorter sub-periods and taking into account all arriving information on the
underlying processes. This approach is illustrated in our main example on ood risk management via
water releases according to ood warnings at multiple alarm times (see section 3.1).
Furthermore, the assumption of Poisson loss arrivals, which seems more restrictive than the other
assumptions, can also be further generalized to a non-homogeneous Erlang arrival process (see Ignatov
and Kaishev 2012b; note Erlang distribution is a special case of Gamma distribution and so, generalizes
the exponential inter-arrival times arising from a Poisson process) and to the case where the inter-
arrival times follow a linear combination of non-identical exponential distributions (see Dimitrova
et al. 2013b).
As mentioned in section 1, in some real life risk situations, the occurrence of the exceedance
(failure) event fT < xg may not mean an immediate system's failure. Therefore, given failure at
time T , we will also be interested in the amount Y , by which the total loss S(T ) exceeds the critical
risk level h(T ), which we call decit, i.e. in the random variable Y = S(T )   h(T )  YN(T )   h(T ).
More precisely, we will assume that the system is still operational if an exceedance event occurs
and simultaneously, the decit Y is below a certain pre-determined (controllable) threshold level
y  0; and assume that the system fails immediately at time T < x if Y > y. Thus, in this
setting, we are concerned with the more realistic failure event fT < x; Y > yg, determined by
the joint distribution of the random variables T and Y , and more precisely, with the probability
of its occurrence, P (T < x; Y > y). Under the assumptions of Poisson loss arrivals and the setup
introduced above, the following explicit expression for P (T < x; Y > y) is obtained by Ignatov and
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Kaishev (2012a),
P (T < x; Y > y) =
Z +1
y
f(y1)dy1  
Z h(x)+y
y
e h
 1(y1 y)f(y1)dy1   e x
Z +1
h(x)+y
f(y1)dy1
+
1X
k=2
Z
: : :
Z
Ck

Bk 2
 
h 1 (yk 1) ; 1; : : : ; k 2
 Bk 1  h 1 (yk   y) ; 1; : : : ; k 1	 f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
+
1X
k=2
Z
: : :
Z
Dk

Bk 2
 
h 1 (yk 1) ; 1; : : : ; k 2
 Bk 1 (x; y1; : : : ; yk 1)	 f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1; (5)
where Ck = f(y1; : : : ; yk) : 0 < y1 < : : : < yk 1  yk 1 + y < yk < h(x) + yg,
Dk = f(y1; : : : ; yk) : 0 < y1 < : : : < yk 1 < h(x)  h(x) + y  yk < +1g,
Bk(z; 1; : : : ; k) = e
 z A0 + A1 (z; 1) +   + kAk (z; 1; : : : ; k), and Ak(z) are as in (4) the
classical Appell polynomials.
Let us note that, when y = 0, formula (5) coincides with formula (3) (see Appendix A for a detailed
proof). The assumption of Poisson loss arrivals can again be generalized to non-homogeneous Erlang
arrivals, which can be adapted to t an arbitrary distribution via randomization, and an explicit
expression for P (T < x; Y > y) in this case is derived in Appendix B.
2.2 Model B
In this section, we provide a detailed description of model B. To distinguish it from model A, we
refer to model B as the dual risk model and use the subscript \dual" in the notations. We assume a
system starts to operate at an initial surplus level u, u > 0. Its further operation generates gains and
losses. The losses are non-stochastic and arrive continuously following a deterministic function of time,
g(t), with the initial condition, g(0) = 0. The operability of the system is maintained dynamically
by a gain process S(t), consisting of a series of consecutive gains, denoted by the random variables
W1;W2; : : :, occurring at random moments, T1; T2; : : :. The number of gains arriving before time t
follows a counting process N(t) :=maxfi : Ti  tg, t > 0, which is independent of the gain sizes.
Again, as a start, we assume that N(t) is a Poisson process with a constant intensity  > 0, i.e. the
inter-arrival times 1 = T1; 2 = T2   T1; 3 = T3   T2; : : :, are i.i.d. exponentially distributed with
parameter . Thus, we have
S(t) =
N(t)X
i=1
Wi;
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and the risk process is therefore
R(t) = u  g(t) + S(t):
Note that we can write R(t) =  hdual(t) + S(t), where hdual(t) =  u + g(t) and that in contrast
to model A, where the initial surplus could be zero, here u > 0. Again, we are interested in the
probability of the risk process reaching the horizontal axis within a nite period [0; x], representing
the loss process hitting the gain process from below (as illustrated in Figure 2) causing the overall
failure of the system at time Tdual. More precisely, we would be interested in the probability of non-
failure, P (Tdual > x), where the instant of the failure (exceedance) event, Tdual, is dened through the
risk process as
Tdual := infft : t > 0; R(t) < 0g:
Clearly, the denition of Tdual can be re-written as
Tdual = infft : t > 0; u  g(t) +
N(t)X
i=0
Wi < 0g
= infft : t > 0;
N(t)X
i=0
Wi <  u+ g(t)g
= infft : t > 0;
N(t)X
i=0
Wi < hdual(t)g;
where hdual(t) =  u+g(t). Thus, the failure event, fTdual < xg, is essentially equivalent to a trajectory
S(t) hitting a lower risk bound hdual(t), as illustrated in Figure 2.
As shown by Dimitrova et al. (2013b), an enlightening connection between models A and B can be
made by reecting the left panel of Figure 2 with respect to bisector y = t, as demonstrated in Figure
3. Thus, the problem of nding the probability of a trajectory hitting a lower bound is translated to
that of nding the probability of a trajectory hitting an upper bound with reverse interpretations of
the model parameters in A and B and some minor adjustments (see Lemma 2.1 in Dimitrova et al.
2013b for more details). With such a duality link, the results on the probability of the overall system
failure within a nite horizon in model B can be easily translated to and restated in terms of model
A.
It is worth noting that under model B, as shown in the right panel of Figure 2, the decit at the
instant Tdual, of the risk process crossing the horizontal axis, is zero, i.e. Y = S(Tdual) hdual(Tdual) = 0.
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Figure 2: Model B. Left panel: hdual(t) (red/straight line) represents the lower risk level bound and
S(t) (blue/staircase line) is the stochastic gain process. Right panel: the risk process R(t).
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Figure 3: A connection between model A and model B through a reection along the 45 line.
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Therefore, in model B, as opposed to model A, we will not be interested in the decit, Y , at the failure
time Tdual.
3 RISK ANALYSIS APPLICATIONS
In this section, we demonstrate that models A and B can be eectively applied as risk analytic tools in
analyzing system reliability risk, inventory and supply chain risk management, control of ood risk via
dam management, risk of emerging disease spread losses and nancial and solvency risk management.
For this purpose, without loss of generality, for numerical illustrations we have specied the failure
event arrivals to follow a Poisson process and the severities W1;W2; : : : to be independent, identically
distributed random variables. For alternative non-Poisson failure event arrivals, e.g. non-identical
Erlang inter-arrival times one can implement formula (12) for P (T < x; Y > y) without substantial
additional computational cost, as has been demonstrated for instance in Dimitrova et al. (2013b)
for the special case of computing P (T > x). Dependence between the consecutive losses, e.g. using
copula functions, can also be numerically implemented, as shown in Dimitrova et al. (2013a).
3.1 Control of ood risk via dam management
In this application, we consider the control of ood risk via dam management. Risk analysis in
dam management has been intensively explored in the existing literature, see e.g. Lave and Balvanyos
(1998), Valdes and Marco (1995), and Cox (2009), to mention only a few of the works. As discussed by
Lave and Balvanyos (1998), there are various reasons that may cause dam failures. Here, we focus on
the dam failure due to water level overtopping its crest. As has been reported by the US Association
of State Dam Safety Ocials, failure of dams due to overtopping accounts for approximately 34%
of all dam failures in US. Quantitative and probabilistic risk models have been utilized in previous
literature as risk analytic tools with a two-fold purpose: for modelling overtopping events, and for
decision-making on managing water releases for dams and reservoirs, see e.g. Goodarzi et al. (2011),
Serrano-Lombillo et al. (2011), Tingsanchali and Chinnarasri (2001) and Kwon and Moon (2006).
Our approach to the rst problem is to model the occurrence of an overtopping event using model
A, introduced in section 2.1. The latter assumes a stochastic process modelling the occurrence of
record high water levels, and a critical threshold level close below the crest of the dam. We introduce
the critical level, which if reached by the water signals a warning alarm. This is a core part of our
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methodology, proposed as a solution to the second problem of managing water releases. It allows
for dynamically determining appropriate instants for water releases to eciently mitigate the risk of
overtopping. In order to implement this novel methodology, as we show, it is essential to be able to
evaluate the probability that, within a xed time period, the running record water level will exceed
the critical threshold, and also the probability of overtopping the crest within such a period. The
latter is shown to be expressed as the probability of the running record water level exceeding the
critical threshold by an amount greater than the dierence between the critical threshold level and
the crest. We demonstrate that it is possible to evaluate these probabilities using the probabilistic
results presented in Section 2. Following is a more formal introduction of our ood risk mitigation
methodology.
T1 T2 Tc=T3 T=T4 x
t
Y1
Y2
h
Y3
H
Yt
running record
threshold level
dam height
T1 T2 T3 Tc=T=T4 x
t
Y1
Y2
h
Y3
H
Yt
running record
threshold level
dam height
Figure 4: A stochastic model for the risk of overtopping.
It often happens that, as a result of heavy rains, ood water levels in dams increase rapidly, almost
jump-wise. This suggests that such a process can be modelled by a pure jump stochastic process,
S(t), dened as in (1), where ood jumps in the water level are of unknown random sizes, W1;W2; : : :,
occurring at some random moments T1; T2; : : : (see Figure 4). Let us note that it is relevant to
assume only positive (upward) jumps, i.e. Wi > 0, since negative (downward) jumps due to water
releases for various other purposes (e.g. irrigation) are usually deterministic and can be considered
negligible compared to huge inows of ood water in the dams, causing upward jumps in the water
level. The record levels of such a process can be denoted as Y1 = W1; Y2 = W1 +W2; : : : (see Figure
4). It is then natural to assume that there is an underlying process N(t) :=maxfi : Ti  tg, t > 0,
counting the occurrences, T1; T2 : : : of the running records, Y1; Y2; : : :, before time t. In accordance
with Cheng et al. (1993), we assume that N(t) follows a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity
12
, although our modelling framework A (see section 2.1) allows other processes to be considered when
calibrating the model in practice. The event of overtopping within a time period [0; x] would then
occur at time T < x, when the running record water level, YN(T ), exceeds the crest of the dam,
denoted by H (see Figure 4). This corresponds to the denition of T through the risk process, R(t),
introduced in (2) (see section 2). As an overtopping risk preventive measure, it is natural to consider
a critical (warning) threshold water level h(t), lower than the crest, H, to signal the necessity of
water release in the event of the exceedance YN(t) > h(t). If we denote by Tc the instant at which
the exceedance event, YN(Tc) > h(Tc), occurs, we can then evaluate its probability, (1   P (Tc > x)),
using formula (3) of section 2 with T replaced by Tc. In general, our model allows the warning level,
h(t) to vary over time, reecting particular environmental circumstances, e.g. current weather and
precipitation levels and their forecasts, but without loss of generality here we will assume a constant
level, h(t) = h < H. As illustrated in the left and right panels of Figure 4, overtopping may result
following two alternative scenarios. However, trajectories such as that in the left panel are not of
interest, as water can be directly released when the running record, YN(Tc), exceeds the threshold
level h at time Tc, to avoid overtopping. Thus, we only consider trajectories that cause overtopping,
as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 4, which corresponds to the exceedance, YN(Tc)   h, being
greater than H   h. Therefore, it is also important to embed the exceedance, Y = YN(Tc)   h, in our
modelling framework. We note that the exceedance, Y = YN(Tc)   h, directly corresponds to what
we introduced earlier in section 2.1 as the decit Y . It is now natural to consider the probability
that an overtopping at time T  Tc will occur within a nite time period [0; x], which is equivalent
to considering the probability, P (Tc < x; Y > y), that the exceedance event, YN(Tc) > h, occurs,
and the exceedance, Y = YN(Tc)   h, is greater than y = H   h. The latter overtopping probability,
P (Tc < x; Y > y), can be computed using formula (5) of section 2.
In what follows, we rst numerically illustrate the evaluation of the probability, P (Tc < x), of
exceeding the critical level h, and the overtopping probability P (Tc < x; Y > H   h) (see Example
3.1). This allows us to comment on the sensitivity of the latter with respect to the choice of the
critical level h. Then, we concentrate on demonstrating how the two probabilities naturally arise in
the denition of a ood warning alarm time, which is at the core of our proposed methodology for
ood water release.
Example 3.1 (Control of ood risk via dam management.)
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For the purpose of this example, we consider two alternative scenarios, one with small/medium-sized
ood jumps in the water level, W1;W2; : : :, occurring more frequently, and a second scenario with
possibly large jumps, W1;W2; : : :, occurring with a lower frequency. In the rst scenario, the jump
sizes are assumed independent, exponentially distributed with parameter , i.e. W Exp(), and
occur according to a Poisson process with a high intensity . In the second case,  is assumed low
and in order to model high-severity jumps, we assume the Wi's are i.i.d. following a generic Pareto
distribution with shape parameter  and scale parameter , with probability density function
fW (z) =

(z + )+1
; z > 0;
which belongs to the family of heavy tailed distributions. With a selected set of parameter values, we
compute the probabilities P (Tc < x) and P (Tc < x; Y > H   h) for varying x, see Figure 5. In order
to make a fair comparison, we have equated  in the two situations, where  is the mean of Wi, so
that the expected total water inow severity per unit of time is identical in the two scenarios. As we
assume small  in the rst scenario, it is not very likely to have a single water inow that causes an
exceedance event with severity Y = YN(Tc)   h(Tc) > H   h, and so P (Tc < x; Y > H   h) is close
to zero. Thus, we compute and plot the overtopping probability, P (Tc < x; Y > H   h), only for the
case of Pareto distributed W 's.
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Figure 5: The probabilities P (Tc < x) (solid lines) and P (Tc < x; Y > H   h) (dashed lines) against
varying x. Left panel: exponential water inow severities with parameter values  = 10 and  = 0:2.
Right panel: Pareto water inow severities with parameter values  = 1,  = 50 and  = 2. Other
parameter values: H = 100, h1 = 0:8H (blue lines) and h2 = 0:9H (red lines).
As noted, the expected total water inow severity per unit of time is the same but because the
Pareto distribution is heavy-tailed, the exceedance probability, P (Tc < x) for any xed value of x, is
clearly higher in this case (see Figure 5). Furthermore, the exceedance probability P (Tc < x) is higher
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for any value x in the case of h1 = 0:8H, which is natural to expect since h1 = 0:8H < h2 = 0:9H.
As opposed to the exceedance probability, the overtopping probability P (Tc < x; Y > H  h) is lower
for h1 = 0:8H, which is also to be expected, because a lower h leads to a higher H   h and therefore
the event Y > H   h of overtopping is less likely, see the right panel of Figure 5. This illustrates the
importance of the choice of the critical level h and its impact on the overtopping probability. We have
selected two dierent values of h to illustrate that a low critical level h1 leads to a higher probability
of sounding an alarm but such a warning is less \alarming" as H   h1 is larger which leaves more
space before the crest of the dam is reached. As demonstrated, a high threshold level h2 can be more
indicative of the risk of overtopping but would leave insucient time for the projected water release to
take place before an overtopping event occurs, which can be very risky and therefore is not desirable.
Clearly, a balanced choice of the threshold level h should be sought.
T1 T2 Τ1=T3 Τ2=T4 x
t
Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4
Yt
running record
threshold level
dam height
Figure 6: A direct strategy of dam management where water is released instantaneously at the time
instants when the pre-specied critical threshold h is exceeded.
Next, we focus our attention on the second problem of managing water releases. Here, we consider
a series of water releases of deterministic amounts at certain moments, 1; 2; : : :, within a nite-
time horizon [0; x], in order to avoid overtopping events and prevent loss of lives and damage to
property as a result of overtopping. In order to incorporate water releases in our model, we assume
that the real time needed for a water release is negligibly small, i.e. an appropriate (deterministic)
amount of water is released instantaneously, and thus preventing overtopping. Mathematically, such
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deterministic downward (negative) jumps in the water level process are equivalent to upward jumps
of the same sizes in the upper bounds representing the threshold level h(t) and the height of the dam
H, as illustrated in Figure 6. Of course this is only an equivalent mathematical transformation of the
model. In reality, the height of the dam H is xed and cannot be increased. However, for the purpose
of computing the related overtopping probability, such a formal mathematical transformation is very
helpful.
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Figure 7: A probabilistic strategy of dam management incorporating an early warning signalling for
water releases based on the exceedance probability P (Tc < t).
A natural question then arises. \When is the appropriate time to release water?" A direct answer
is not to release water until the water reaches the threshold level h at time Tc, as illustrated in Figure
6. As mentioned earlier, the event of the water level exceeding the pre-specied critical threshold h
could serve as an early warning that the water level is alarmingly high and water should be released
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to prevent overtopping. However, this may not be a wise idea since the time Tc of water release is a
random variable and therefore is not predictable at time t = 0. In addition, it may be argued that it
is too late and risky to release water at the exceedance time Tc, which will not reduce the likelihood of
the occurrence of an overtopping event at time Tc. More precisely, this warning strategy only works if
the water level exceeds the critical threshold level h but does not reach the crest of the dam H, i.e. as
illustrated by the scenario in the left panel of Figure 4. Should the overtopping event occur at time Tc
(see the right panel of Figure 4), this strategy does not suggest any warning or preventive measures
prior to the overtopping event. It is therefore not a very ecient way of mitigating overtopping risk.
An alternative strategy that could be pursued is to determine the moment for a water release based
on the value of P (Tc < t), as illustrated in Figure 7. Clearly, P (Tc < t) is a monotonically increasing
function of t with P (Tc < 0) = 0. Thus, it is possible to nd the instant  , such that the probability,
P (Tc < ), of the water level hitting the threshold level h within a nite period [0;  ], reaches a
prescribed (critical) value , 0 <   1, when the likelihood of an exceedance event, YN(t) > h(t),
becomes signicant. This is the forecasted time at which water should be released. Depending on the
parameter settings and the value of ,  can sometimes be larger than x. In such a case, water should
be released at time x. Mathematically, such an alarm time is dened as
 = sup f0 < t  x : P (Tc < t)  g : (6)
In contrast to the direct strategy of releasing water at the (random) time Tc, here  is not random
and is predetermined at time t = 0. As can be seen from (6), in order to compute  , it sucies to be
able to compute the exceedance probability P (Tc < t), which as demonstrated in Example 3.1 can be
done using formula (3) of section 2.
With denition (6), we revisit Example 3.1, and compute the alarm times  with varying threshold
level h, as plotted in Figure 8, assuming the ood jumps Wi are independent, Pareto distributed. As
can be seen, the alarm time depends on the prescribed (critical) probability  and on the choice of h,
which reemphasizes the remark we have made earlier that the pre-specied threshold level h should
be selected carefully in order to be used eectively in providing early warning signals. It is worth
noting that, because we require two correct digits after the decimal point when computing the alarm
time  , the curves appear like a staircase. They should be smooth should an innite accuracy of  be
pursued.
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Figure 8: Alarm times against varying threshold levels. Blue, red and orange lines represent  =
0:01; 0:05; 0:1 respectively. Parameter values:  = 1,  = 50,  = 2 and H = 100.
Following the denition of a single alarm (6), it is also possible to dene a system with multiple
alarms. Suppose the rst alarm is sounded at time 1 to warn the water level is alarmingly high.
Reasonably, the projected water release should take place to decrease the likelihood of an overtopping
event. Suppose at each alarm time i < x, i  1, the water height is lowered by some deterministic
amount vi, which as we explained earlier can be viewed equivalently as an instantaneous upward jump
of the same size vi in the upper bound. Thus, the upper bound h(t) becomes a process with pure
jumps of known sizes vi at deterministic moments i, starting at h(0) = h. Given survival until time
i, the next alarm time i+1 can be dened as
i+1 = sup fi < t  x : P (Tc < tjTc > i)  i+1g ; i  1; (7)
where figi1 is a sequence of prescribed critical probability levels, i > 0, i = 1; 2; : : :. For simplicity,
one may use the same value of  for consecutive alarm times, i.e. i = .
It has to be noted that the second strategy proposed here to release water at time i, based on
denition (7), also does not provide a perfect prevention from an overtopping event. Clearly, this
strategy is probabilistic, and it does not completely prevent an overtopping event occurring before
x, although the overtopping probability is very small (smaller than ). Certainly, smaller  might be
used to further diminish the overtopping probability. However, this would lead to a higher frequency
of water release, which is again not desirable.
A more practical way of dam management could be to employ a hybrid strategy of the two
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alternatives discussed above. More precisely, a series of alarm times i for water releases can be
computed at the start time t = 0 based on (7), and the actual water level would also need to be
inspected over time. Thus, water should be released at each alarm time i to prevent overtopping,
and in the very unlikely event of the prescribed threshold level h being exceeded, water would be
release immediately.
Finally, another remark should be made that the idea of employing an early warning system in
risk analysis has been extensively explored in previous literature, see e.g. Pate-Cornell (1986), Das
and Kratz (2012), etc. It is worth noting that the way of dening the early warning (alarm) times is
not unique. Here, we have considered the nite-time exceedance probability, P (Tc < t), as the central
quantity determining the alarm time. Other quantities, such as the size of a single water inow severity
(Probable Maximum Flood, see e.g. Bullard (1986)), or the joint probability P (Tc < t; Y > H   h),
can also be considered when devising alarm time systems.
3.2 Other risk analysis applications
3.2.1 Systems reliability risk
In this application, losses, W1;W2; : : :, occur at random moments in time, T1; T2; : : : and may vary
in size, from relatively small but multiply occurring losses, e.g. slowdowns and server failures in
computer networks disrupting electronic business transactions, to possibly huge losses due to not
so frequent but severe failures. In general, as noted by Todinov (2006), losses can be measured in
dierent units, e.g. in lost production time or volumes of defective products, lost lives, nancial losses
due to credit defaults, insurance claims or tax avoidance, amount of hazardous chemicals released in
the environment, warranty payments and lost customers, etc. As has been established by Todinov
(2006) \maximizing the reliability of a system, does not necessarily minimize the losses from failures".
The author considers an interesting alternative approach to reliability allocation based on maximizing
the prot expected to emerge from the operation of the system. It can be argued that this problem,
and the related problem of assuring that prot stays positive within a xed time interval with a very
high probability, can be addressed applying the risk theoretic approach, formalized as model A in
section 2.1. Thus, the problem of interest, which can be viewed as an extension of the model and
prot optimization problem considered by Todinov (2006), can be stated as follows.
Problem 1. Find an appropriate \aggregate gain" function h(t) 2 H, such that the probability
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of the system's non-failure (survival)
P (T > x) = 1  P

inf
0tx
(h(t)  S(t)) < 0

 1  ; (8)
where  > 0 is a suciently small preassigned value, H is a rather general class of non-decreasing
possibly discontinuous functions, h(t), which may have jumps (e.g. a practically important case is
step-wise constant h(t)), and the loss severities Wi, i = 1; 2; : : :, can be integer-valued or continu-
ous, with any joint loss distribution, including multivariate dependent distributions, e.g. any copula
construction.
We note that, depending on the choices of H and , the solution for Problem 1 may not exist, or
if it exists, it may not be unique. Therefore, one may sometimes pursue an optimal solution in some
sense, e.g. maximizing the nite-time survival probability in (8). It is also worth mentioning that,
because H is a fairly general class of functions, it may not be possible to solve Problem 1 analytically
and numerical approaches may need to be considered. In order to solve Problem 1 numerically,
formulas (3) and (5) can successfully be applied. We illustrate how this is done in the next example,
by imposing restrictive assumptions on the class H.
Example 3.2 (Systems reliability risk.)
In this example, we assume the loss severities Wi, i = 1; 2; : : :, follow an i.i.d. logarithmic distribution
with parameter , i.e. W Log(), with generic probability mass function P (W = i) =  i=(i ln (1 
)). N(t) is assumed a homogeneous Poisson process with constant intensity . We denote by u,
u > 0, the initial surplus level of the system, i.e. h(0) = u, and consider H as a class of piecewise
functions with an upward jump of xed size J at time tJ , tJ 2 [0; x], from which we select h(t), which
is the solution to Problem 1. Including a jump of size J in the gain function h(t), which may occur
at a variable time tJ , can be interpreted as a lump-sum capital injection to avoid the system failure
within the time period [0; x]. We assume that the critical risk level h(t) has dierent slopes before
and after the jump time tJ , denoted respectively by c1 and c2, where c1 is xed and c2 is determined
by the instant of the jump tJ . This is to ensure that all gain functions h(t) belonging to H reach the
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same gain level at the end of the time period, x. Mathematically, 8h(t) 2 H, we have
h(t) =
(
u+ c1t; 0  t < tJ ;
u+ c1tJ + J + c2(t  tJ); tJ  t  x:
(9)
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Figure 9: Left panel: two possible candidates h1(t); h2(t) 2 H. Right panel: P (T > x) as a function
of the location tJ of the jump of size J . Parameter values:  = 5,  = 0:1, u = 12:5, c1 = 3, x = 2,
J = 2:5 and  = 0:01.
In the left panel of Figure 9, we plot two possible candidates from the class H for illustrative
purposes. As discussed, both choices of the gain functions h(t) reach the same level of h(x) at the
end, x, of the time interval considered, and the after-jump slope varies according to the location of the
jump. For a selected parameter set, we evaluate the nite-time survival probability with the discrete
version of formula (3), utilizing the fact that formula (3) is valid for any non-negative non-decreasing
function allowing jumps, and numerical results are summarized in the right panel of Figure 9. As
can be observed, there are many functions h(t) from the chosen class H which provide solutions to
Problem 1. Therefore, we choose the one which maximizes the probability of non-failure P (T > x).
The latter is achieved by nding an appropriate tJ , i.e. the moment of capital injection of size J .
It is observed that, moving the location tJ of the jump J = 2:5 from tJ = 0 to tJ = 2 with the
other parameter values xed, the survival probability P (T > 2) rst increases slowly and then drops
quickly, and a unique maximum is reached at tJ = 0:9.
It has to be mentioned that the numerical illustration in this example is rather simple, based on the
specic class of functions H selected, and a unique solution to Problem 1 of maximizing the nite-time
survival probability has been obtained. With more general choices of H in more complex situations
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in system reliability risk analysis, one may not be able to nd an optimal solution to Problem 1 and
a more involved functional analysis approach may need to be utilized. The framework itself may
also need to be calibrated carefully in order to t the real scenarios properly, but the methodology
described in section 2 would be general enough to cover most, if not all, real system characteristics.
3.2.2 Inventory management risk
This example illustrates the application of our risk modelling approach to management and main-
tenance of an inventory of products over a predetermined time period. There are two important
processes related to an inventory of a product, the demand process which is described by the amount
of units and time instants they are withdrawn from inventory and the replenishment process which
species the amounts of units and instants at which they are replenished to inventory. It is essential
to note that in real inventory problems considerable uncertainty may be related to both the times of
arrivals and levels of orders for needed production materials and nished goods (see e.g. Hillier and
Lieberman 2010, Ch. 18). This leads to the necessity to construct stochastic inventory maintenance
models in which both demand and/or replenishment of inventory follow appropriate stochastic pro-
cesses. We note that the risk analysis approaches described above under both models A and B, can
be successfully applied in modelling the amount of products maintained in inventory so that the prob-
ability of demand exceeding supply, i.e., the probability of a shortage in inventory over a xed time
interval, is kept suciently low. Under model A it would be natural to assume that predetermined
xed amounts of units are stocked in inventory at certain predetermined dates, which in aggregate
forms the system's (deterministic) gain process h(t), as described in section 2.1. The demand process
S(t) is considered stochastic, assuming that certain orders for random quantities W1;W2; : : : of units
arrive at random times T1; T2; : : : following e.g. market needs. This is in line with S(t) given in (1)
(see also the assumptions of model A in section 2.1). The probability of demand exceeding supply
within a nite time interval of size x can then be evaluated by utilizing formula (3). In this case, it
is relevant to consider as failure the event fT < x; Y > yg, where T is the time the demand process
exceeds the replenishment process, and given this, the decit in demand Y exceeds a pre-determined
acceptable level y, and formula (5) can then be applied to compute the likelihood of this event. Al-
ternatively, in many real inventory maintenance situations, it is relevant to assume that inversely, the
demand process follows a deterministic pattern h(t), e.g. orders for xed predetermined volumes of
goods are ordered to be shipped at predetermined dates, as in the assumptions of model B, while the
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replenishment of goods follows a stochastic process, S(t), as specied in section 2.2. There are various
examples of such inventory management models in the literature, see e.g. Heyman and Sobel (2003);
Resurreccion and Santos (2012).
3.2.3 Risk of emerging disease (ED) spread losses
In this application, losses occur due to an emerging (infectious) disease (ED) aecting e.g. sh
populations in catsh farms in US. A risk analytic approach to modelling such losses at a single farm
level, was recently proposed by Zagmutt et al. (2013), for the purpose of assessing the possibility
of launching agricultural insurance cover to protect catsh producers. The authors apply stochastic
disease spread modelling (DSM), implemented via Monte Carlo (MC) simulation in order to estimate
the total loss cost, LCed (see Eq. (1) in Zagmutt et al. (2013)), due to sh mortality resulting from
the spread of an ED in sh ponds belonging to a farm.
This approach can be further extended to model the losses from disease spread at a multi-farm
level, where we focus on infection spreading between farms rather than between ponds within a single
farm. Following Zagmutt et al. (2013), it is again assumed that disease spread between farms can be
triggered by direct and indirect contacts, modelled by a Poisson process. The numerical results in
Zagmutt et al. (2013) reveal that the total loss caused by sh mortalities for a single farm, LCed, is
a random variable which follows a certain distribution, that is estimated using MC simulation. Thus,
in a multi-farm system, where an ED spreads from one farm to another, the loss from each individual
farm, LCed, can be modelled by a random variable Wi, i = 1; 2; : : :. Therefore, it is natural to assume
a certain dependence structure governing the farm loss severities,W1;W2; : : :, as specied in our model
A of section 2.1. Some organizations (or certain lines of business in an insurance company) may be
concerned with the total loss caused by disease spread between farms at a state or national level, and
may therefore be interested in providing some protection (e.g. insurance) for the total loss against
an appropriate cumulative premium h(t). Such a problem setup naturally meets the assumptions
of model A described in section 2.1, and the results on the probability that the total loss from sh
mortality at a multi-farm level exceeds the accumulated premium, h(t), can be therefore applied in
this case in order to determine whether this risk is insurable.
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3.2.4 Risk of nancial ruin and insolvency
Our nal application is concerned with the risk of nancial ruin and insolvency. The event of a
technical ruin (insolvency), i.e. failure, occurs when the aggregate expense outgo exceeds the aggregate
income inow within a predetermined nite time horizon. Modelling the risk of ruin and insolvency
and allocating sucient risk capital, so as to minimize the probability of insolvency, is crucial for the
healthy nancial operation of rms. Companies from the nancial services sector, such as insurance
companies, hedge funds and other investment funds and banks are exposed to the occurrence of
liabilities, typically insurance claims, devaluation of assets, credit defaults etc., which occur at some
random moments in time i and whose sizes are also considered random variables Wi as in the
assumptions of model A (see section 2.1). On the other hand there is an inow of income from
operations of such companies. Typically, this would be premium income, capital gains from interests
on deposits, mortgages, investments or other nancial transactions, as specied in the assumptions of
Model A. The probability of technical ruin within a nite-time horizon can be evaluated and used to
determine the size of the risk capital. For further details of how model A is applied in the context of
operational risk of nancial rms we refer to Kaishev et al. (2008).
Alternatively, one can apply model B for other non-nancial companies, where the W 's are inter-
preted as capital gains occurring as a result of successful discoveries or mineral nds, or innovations,
while aggregate operational costs follow a non-decreasing deterministic function (see section 2.2). For
specic details of how model B is employed in modelling the operations of companies with continuous
expenses and stochastic capital gains we refer to Dimitrova et al. (2013b).
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced two dually connected stochastic models A and B for quantifying the risk of failure
and have interpreted the related model parameters and variables to t specic applications in risk
analysis. Under very general assumptions, we have provided new expressions for the probability that
a risk factor exceeds a possibly time-dependent risk level, while at the same time, the exceedance
over this level is greater than a pre-determined (decit) value. Thus, we have demonstrated that
expressions (3), (5) and (12) are quite general and hence, applicable in providing solutions to many
risk analytic problems appearing in dam management, systems reliability, inventory management,
infectious disease spread and nancial insolvency (see section 3). We have further demonstrated
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that having such explicit expressions is numerically appealing in quantifying the risk of failure and
designing early warning systems incorporating alarm times. We note that the denition of an alarm
time is not unique. As suggested by Das and Kratz (2010), who devise various alarm systems in the
context of actuarial science and insurance, alternative ways of dening alarm times may be pursued,
see also Dimitrova et al. (2014). Finally, let us also note that in some real situations it may also be
necessary to compute the innite-time horizon failure probability. For instance, failure and reliability
of a system may be of interest over a very long (innite) time-horizon. Such probabilities can be
determined using e.g. the results due to Ignatov and Kaishev (2006).
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Appendix
A A proof on the equivalence of formula (3) with (5) when y = 0
In this section, we provide a detailed proof which shows that the expression of P (T > x) given in
formula (3) coincides with the expression of P (T < x; Y > y) given in (5) in the case where y = 0.
Proof: When y = 0, rearranging the terms in formula (5), we have
P (T < x; Y > 0)  P (T < x)
= 1 +
1X
k=2
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z 1
yk 1
Bk 2

h 1(yk 1); y1; : : : ; yk 2

f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
 
1X
k=1
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z h(x)
yk 1
Bk 1

h 1(yk); y1; : : : ; yk 1

f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
 
1X
k=1
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z 1
h(x)
Bk 1

x; y1; : : : ; yk 1

f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1;
which is equivalent to
P (T > x) =  
1X
k=2
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z 1
yk 1
Bk 2

h 1(yk 1); y1; : : : ; yk 2

f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
+
1X
k=1
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z h(x)
yk 1
Bk 1

h 1(yk); y1; : : : ; yk 1

f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
+
1X
k=1
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z 1
h(x)
Bk 1

x; y1; : : : ; yk 1

f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
=   1+ 2+ 3:
We then have
1 =
1X
k=2
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z 1
yk 1
Bk 2

h 1(yk 1); y1; : : : ; yk 2

f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
=
1X
k=2
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Bk 2

h 1(yk 1); y1; : : : ; yk 2
Z 1
yk 1
f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk

dyk 1 : : : dy1
=
1X
k=2
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Bk 2

h 1(yk 1); y1; : : : ; yk 2

f(y1; : : : ; yk 1)dyk 1 : : : dy1
=
1X
k=1
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 1
Bk 1

h 1(yk); y1; : : : ; yk 1

f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
= 2;
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indicating that
P (T > x) =   1+ 2+ 3 = 3:
Thus,
P (T > x) =
1X
k=1
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z 1
h(x)
Bk 1

x; y1; : : : ; yk 1

f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
=
1X
k=1
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z 1
h(x)
e x
k 1X
i=0
Ai(x;1; : : : ; i)f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
= e x
1X
k=1
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 2
Z 1
h(x)
k 1X
i=0
iAi(x; 1; : : : ; i)f(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk : : : dy1
= e x
1X
k=0
kX
i=0
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 1
Z 1
h(x)
iAi(x; 1; : : : ; i)f(y1; : : : ; yk+1)dyk+1 : : : dy1:
Permuting the two sums, we obtain
P (T > x) = e x
1X
i=0
1X
k=i
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yk 1
Z 1
h(x)
iAi(x; 1; : : : ; i)f(y1; : : : ; yk+1)dyk+1 : : : dy1
= e x
1X
i=0
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yi 1
iAi(x; 1; : : : ; i) 1X
k=i
Z h(x)
yi
  
Z h(x)
yk 1
Z 1
h(x)
f(y1; : : : ; yk+1)dyk+1 : : : dyi+1
!
dyi : : : dy1
= e x
1X
i=0
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yi 1
iAi(x; 1; : : : ; i)
Z 1
h(x)
f(y1; : : : ; yi+1)dyi+1 +
Z h(x)
yi
Z 1
h(x)
f(y1; : : : ; yi+2)dyi+2dyi+1Z h(x)
yi
Z h(x)
yi+1
Z 1
h(x)
f(y1; : : : ; yi+3)dyi+3dyi+2dyi+1 +   

dyi : : : dy1:
Noting that the term in the brackets is identically equal to f(y1; : : : ; yi), we have
P (T > x) = e x
1X
i=0
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yi 1
iAi(x; 1; : : : ; i)f(y1; : : : ; yi)dyi : : : dy1
= e x
 
1 +
1X
i=1
Z h(x)
0
  
Z h(x)
yi 1
iAi(x; 1; : : : ; i)f(y1; : : : ; yi)dyi : : : dy1
!
;
which completes the proof.
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B A derivation of the joint probability of the time to ruin and the
decit at ruin in model A assuming independent, non-identically
Erlang distributed inter-arrival times
Here, we provide a detailed derivation of the joint probability that the time to ruin T < x and the
decit at ruin Y > y in model A with independent non-identically Erlang distributed inter-arrival
times. In what follows, we only consider the case of continuous losses. However, we note that, for the
case of discrete losses, an analogous derivation can be followed and similar results could be obtained.
Under the setup of model A, let i, i = 1; 2; : : :, be a sequence of independent, non-identical
random variables, denoting the inter-arrival times. We assume these are independent, non-identically
Erlang distributed random variables with shape parameter gi > 0, and rate parameter i > 0, i.e.
i Erlang(gi; i). Let li = g1 +    + gi, i = 1; 2; : : :. Similar to Ignatov and Kaishev (2012b), we
introduce an integer-valued function j(k), k = 0; 1; 2; : : :, such that
g1 + : : :+ gj(k) = lj(k)  k < lj(k)+1 = g1 + : : :+ gj(k) + gj(k)+1: (10)
Let f~ngn1 be a sequence of independent, exponentially distributed random variables with parameters
1; 2; : : : correspondingly, i.e. ~n Exp(n), such that k+1 = j(k)+1, k = 0; 1; 2; : : :. Thus, we have
(~1 +   + ~l1 ; ~l1+1 +   + ~l2 ; : : :) d= (1; 2; : : :):
Obviously, in this more rened representation of the Erlang arrivals in terms of sums of exponentials
we have that
1; : : : ; l1 ; l1+1; : : : ; l2 ; : : :  1; : : : ; 1| {z }
g1
; 2; : : : ; 2| {z }
g2
; : : : ; (11)
noting that the i-s may possibly coincide. In the sequel, it will be convenient to use the notation
~1 ; ~2 ; : : : for the r.v.s ~1; ~2; : : :, in the special case when k+1 = j(k)+1  1, k = 0; 1; 2; : : :.
Denote by T1 = 1; T2 = 1 + 2; : : :, the moments of loss arrivals and introduce the sequence of
random variables ~T1 = ~1, ~T2 = ~1 + ~2; : : :. Obviously, we can also write Ti = ~Tli i = 1; 2; : : :. Let us
also consider the partial sums, Yi, i = 1; 2; : : : of the consecutive losses, Y1 = W1; Y2 = W1 +W2; : : :
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with probability density function fY1;:::;Yi(y1; : : : ; yi)  0 for 0  y1  : : :  yi and 0 otherwise, i.e.
Z
: : :
Z
0y1:::yi
fY1;:::;Yi(y1; : : : ; yi)dy1 : : : dyi = 1:
We will also denote by FY1;:::;Yi(y1; : : : ; yi), the cdf of Y1; : : : ; Yi.
We now introduce the non-decreasing sequence of variables ~Y1; ~Y2; : : :, independent of ~1; ~2; : : :
and such that 0 = ~Y1 = : : : = ~Yl1 1  Y1 = ~Yl1 = : : : = ~Yl2 1  Y2 = ~Yl2 = : : : = ~Yl3 1  : : :.
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition B.1 The probability P (T < x; Y > y), x > 0, y  0, is given by (assuming l1  2)
P (T < x; Y > y) =
1X
k=1
h(x)Z
0
: : :
h(x)Z
yk 2
1Z
yk 1+y
Blk 2
 
h 1(yk 1); 1; : : : ; lk 2

fY1;:::;Yk(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk dyk 1 : : : dy1
 
1X
k=1
h(x)Z
0
: : :
h(x)Z
yk 2
h(x)+yZ
yk 1+y
Blk 1
 
h 1(yk   y); 1; : : : ; lk 1

fY1;:::;Yk(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk dyk 1 : : : dy1
 
1X
k=1
h(x)Z
0
: : :
h(x)Z
yk 2
1Z
h(x)+y
Blk 1 (x; 1; : : : ; lk 1) fY1;:::;Yk(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk dyk 1 : : : dy1; (12)
where
Bk(z; 1; : : : ; k) =
kX
i=0
Bk(z; 1; : : : ; k);
Bk(z; 1; : : : ; k)  Bk(z) are the (classical) exponential Appell polynomials, dened by Ignatov and
Kaishev (2012b) recurrently as
Bk(z) = j(k 1)+1e j(k)+1z
Z z
j(k)
ej(k)+1wBk 1(w)dw; k = 1; 2; : : :
with B0(z) = B0(z) = e
 1z and 0  1  2  : : : is a sequence of real numbers denoting
h 1(0)  : : :  h 1(0)| {z }
g1 1
 h 1(y1)  : : :  h 1(y1)| {z }
g2
 : : : ;
correspondingly.
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Proof: By construction, the event fT < x; Y > yg can be expressed as
fT < x; Y > yg = 1[
k=1

k 1\
i=1
fYi < h(Ti)g \ fYk > h(Tk) + yg \ fTk < xg

=
1[
k=1

k 1\
i=1
n
~Yli < h

~Tli
o
\
n
~Ylk > h

~Tlk

+ y
o
\
n
~Tlk < x
o
:
Clearly,
n
~Yli < h

~Tli
o

n
~Yli < h

~Tli+w
o
for w = 0; 1; : : : ; gi+1   1, which is equivalent ton
~Yli < h

~Tli
o

n
~Yr < h

~Tr
o
for li  r < li+1. Therefore, for any i = 1; 2; : : :,
n
~Yli < h

~Tli
o
 li+1 1\
r=li
n
~Yr < h

~Tr
o
:
In addition, for 1  r < l1, we also have
n
~Yr < h

~Tr
o
=
n
0 < h

~Tr
o
= 
; and hence
l1 1\
r=1
n
~Yr < h

~Tr
o
=

; where 
 is the sure event. Thus, we obtain
fT < x; Y > yg = 1[
k=1

lk 1\
r=1
n
~Yr < h

~Tr
o
\
n
~Ylk > h

~Tlk

+ y
o
\
n
~Tlk < x
o
:
We note that the events in the square brackets are mutually exclusive. Hence, we have
P (T < x; Y > y)
= P

1[
k=1

lk 1\
r=1
n
~Yr < h

~Tr
o
\
n
~Ylk > h

~Tlk

+ y
o
\
n
~Tlk < x
o
=
1X
k=1
P

lk 1\
r=1
n
~Yr < h

~Tr
o
\
n
~Ylk > h

~Tlk

+ y
o
\
n
~Tlk < x
o
(13)
=
1X
k=1
xZ
0
: : :
xZ
tlk 1
f ~T1;:::; ~Tlk
(t1; : : : ; tlk)dtlk : : : dt1
h(t1)Z
0
: : :
h(tlk 1)Z
~ylk 2
1Z
h(tlk )+y
dF ~Y1;:::; ~Ylk
(~y1; : : : ; ~ylk);
where F ~Y1;:::; ~Ylk
(~y1; : : : ; ~ylk) is the joint distribution of
~Y1; : : : ; ~Ylk and f ~T1;:::; ~Tlk
(t1; : : : ; tlk) is the joint
density of ~T1; : : : ; ~Tlk . It can easily be seen that the random vector
~T =

~T1; : : : ; ~Tlk
0
coincides in
distribution with the random vector B lk ~
, i.e., B lk ~
 d= ~T , where ~  =

~1 ; : : : ; ~lk
0
, and B lk is a
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lk  lk dimensional matrix given in a block-matrix form as
B lk 
0BBBB@
b1;1    b1;k
...
. . .
...
bk;1    bk;k
1CCCCA ;
where bm;n is a gm  gn matrix for m;n = 1; : : : ; k, with all entries equal to 1n if m > n, all entries
equal to zero if m < n, and where bn;n is a lower triangular matrix with all elements in the lower
triangle equal to 1n if m = n. Then, it is not dicult to see that
f ~T1;:::; ~Tlk
(t1; : : : ; tlk) =
(
e
 1B 1lk t
detB 1lk 
0
if 0  t1  t2  ...  tlk
otherwise
;
where, 1 =
0B@1; : : : ; 1| {z }
lk
1CA, t = (t1; : : : ; tlk)0, ()0 stands for transposition, and detB 1lk denotes the deter-
minant of the inverse of B lk . It can also be directly veried that the inverse matrix, B
 1
lk
=

~bij

,
is an incomplete, lower triangular matrix, with non-zero elements only at the main and next lower
diagonals, given as
~bm;m =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1 if 1  m  l1
2 if l1 + 1  m  l2
...
...
...
k if lk 1 + 1  m  lk
; ~bm+1;m =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
 1 if 1  m  l1   1
 2 if l1  m  l2   1
...
...
...
 k if lk 1  l  lk   1
;
and with all other elements equal to zero. Then, P (T < x; Y > y) becomes
P (T < x; Y > y)
=
1X
k=1
xZ
0
: : :
xZ
tlk 1
g11 : : : 
gk
k exp[ f1tl1 + 2(tl2   tl1) +   + k(tlk   tlk 1)g]dtlk : : : dt1
h(t1)Z
0
: : :
h(tlk 1)Z
~ylk 2
1Z
h(tlk )+y
dF ~Y1;:::; ~Ylk
(~y1; : : : ; ~ylk):
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Splitting the innermost integral, we have
P (T < x; Y > y)
=
1X
k=1
xZ
0
: : :
xZ
tlk 1
g11 : : : 
gk
k exp[ f1tl1 + 2(tl2   tl1) +   + k(tlk   tlk 1)g]dtlk : : : dt1
h(t1)Z
0
: : :
h(tlk 1)Z
~ylk 2
0B@ 1Z
~ylk 1+y
 
h(tlk )+yZ
~ylk 1+y
1CA dF ~Y1;:::; ~Ylk (~y1; : : : ; ~ylk)
=
1X
k=1
xZ
0
: : :
xZ
tlk 2
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k

exp[ f1tl1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(tlk 1   tlk 1)g]
 exp[ f1t1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(x  tlk 1)g]

dtlk 1 : : : dt1
h(t1)Z
0
: : :
h(tlk 1)Z
~ylk 2
1Z
~ylk 1+y
dF ~Y1;:::; ~Ylk
(~y1; : : : ; ~ylk)
 
1X
k=1
xZ
0
: : :
xZ
tlk 1
g11 : : : 
gk
k exp[ f1tl1 + 2(tl2   tl1) +   + k(tlk   tlk 1)g]dtlk : : : dt1
h(t1)Z
0
: : :
h(tlk 1)Z
~ylk 2
h(tlk )+yZ
~ylk 1+y
dF ~Y1;:::; ~Ylk
(~y1; : : : ; ~ylk):
Permuting the two multiple integrals in the two terms, we obtain
P (T < x; Y > y)
=
1X
k=1
Z
: : :
Z
0<~y1<:::<~ylk 1<h(x)
~ylk 1+y<~ylk<1
dF ~Y1;:::; ~Ylk
(~y1; : : : ; ~ylk)
t2Z
h 1(~y1)
: : :
tlk 1Z
h 1(~ylk 2)
xZ
h 1(~ylk 1)
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k

exp[ f1tl1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(tlk 1   tlk 1)g] 
exp[ f1t1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(x  tlk 1)g]

dtlk 1 : : : dt1
 
1X
k=1
1X
k=1
Z
: : :
Z
0<~y1<:::<~ylk 1<h(x)
~ylk 1+y<~ylk<h(x)+y
dF ~Y1;:::; ~Ylk
(~y1; : : : ; ~ylk)
t2Z
h 1(~y1)
: : :
tlkZ
h 1(~ylk 1)
xZ
h 1(~ylk y)
g11 : : : 
gk
k
exp[ f1tl1 + 2(tl2   tl1) +   + k(tlk   tlk 1)g]dtlk : : : dt1;
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which can be rewritten as
P (T < x; Y > y)
=
1X
k=1
Z
: : :
Z
0<y1<:::<yk 1<h(x)
yk 1+y<yk<1
dFY1;:::;Yk(y1; : : : ; yk)
t2Z
1
: : :
tlk 1Z
lk 2
xZ
h 1(yk 1)
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k

exp[ f1tl1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(tlk 1   tlk 1)g] 
exp[ f1t1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(x  tlk 1)g]

dtlk 1 : : : dt1
 
1X
k=1
Z
: : :
Z
0<y1<:::<yk 1<h(x)
yk 1+y<yk<h(x)+y
dFY1;:::;Yk(y1; : : : ; yk)
t2Z
1
: : :
tlkZ
lk 1
xZ
h 1(yk y)
g11 : : : 
gk
k
exp[ f1tl1 + 2(tl2   tl1) +   + k(tlk   tlk 1)g]dtlk : : : dt1
=
1X
k=1
h(x)Z
0
: : :
h(x)Z
yk 2
1Z
yk 1+y
fY1;:::;Yk(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk dyk 1 : : : dy1
t2Z
1
: : :
tlk 1Z
lk 2
xZ
h 1(yk 1)
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k

exp[ f1tl1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(tlk 1   tlk 1)g] 
exp[ f1t1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(x  tlk 1)g]

dtlk 1 : : : dt1
 
1X
k=1
h(x)Z
0
: : :
h(x)Z
yk 2
h(x)+yZ
yk 1+y
fY1;:::;Yk(y1; : : : ; yk)dyk dyk 1 : : : dy1
t2Z
1
: : :
tlkZ
lk 1
xZ
h 1(yk y)
g11 : : : 
gk
k
exp[ f1tl1 + 2(tl2   tl1) +   + k(tlk   tlk 1)g]dtlk : : : dt1; (14)
where 0  1  2  : : : is a sequence of real numbers denoting
h 1(0)  : : :  h 1(0)| {z }
g1 1
 h 1(y1)  : : :  h 1(y1)| {z }
g2
 : : : ;
correspondingly.
Let B0(z) = e
 1z and for k = 1; 2; : : :,
Bk(z; 1; : : : ; k)  Bk(z)
=
t2Z
1
: : :
tk+1Z
k
1Z
z
1 : : : k+1exp[ f1t1 + 2(t2   t1) +   + k+1(tk+1   tk)g]dtk+1 dtk : : : dt1;
where fsgs1 follow the rened representation (11).
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Permuting the two innermost integrals, we have
Bk(z) =
t2Z
1
: : :
tkZ
k 1
 tk+1Z
k
1Z
z
1 : : : k k+1 exp[ f1t1 + 2(t2   t1) +   + k(tk   tk 1) + k+1(tk+1   tk)g]
dtk+1 dtk
!
dtk 1 : : : dt1
=
t2Z
1
: : :
tkZ
k 1
 1Z
k
1Z
maxftk;zg
1 : : : k k+1 exp[ f1t1 + 2(t2   t1) +   + k(tk   tk 1)  k+1tkg]
e k+1tk+1dtk+1 dtk
!
dtk 1 : : : dt1
=
t2Z
1
: : :
tkZ
k 1
 1Z
k
1 : : : k exp[ f1t1 + 2(t2   t1) +   + k(tk   tk 1)  k+1tkg]
e k+1maxftk;zgdtk
!
dtk 1 : : : dt1
=
t2Z
1
: : :
tkZ
k 1
zZ
k
1 : : : k exp[ f1t1 + 2(t2   t1) +   + k(tk   tk 1)  k+1tkg]e k+1zdtk : : : dt1
+
t2Z
1
: : :
tkZ
k 1
1Z
z
1 : : : k exp[ f1t1 + 2(t2   t1) +   + k(tk   tk 1)  k+1tkg]e k+1tkdtk : : : dt1
= Bk(z; 1; : : : ; k) +Bk 1(z);
where
Bk(z; 1; : : : ; k)  Bk(z)
= e k+1z
t2Z
1
: : :
tkZ
k 1
zZ
k
1 : : : k exp[ f1t1 + 2(t2   t1) +   + k(tk   tk 1)  k+1tkg]dtk : : : dt1:
(15)
Following Lemma A.1, A.2 and Corollary A.3 in Ignatov and Kaishev (2012b) and noting the rened
representation (11), we have
Bk(z) = j(k 1)+1e j(k)+1z
Z z
j(k)
ej(k)+1wBk 1(w)dw; k = 1; 2; : : :
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with B0(z) = e
 1z and j(k) is as dened in (10). It can be easily seen that
Bk(z; 1; : : : ; k) =
kX
i=0
Bi(z; 1; : : : ; i)
with B0(z) = B0(z) = e
 1z.
Thus, we have
t2Z
1
: : :
tlk 1Z
lk 2
xZ
h 1(yk 1)
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k

exp[ f1tl1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(tlk 1   tlk 1)g]
 exp[ f1t1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(x  tlk 1)g]

dtlk 1 : : : dt1
=
t2Z
1
: : :
tlk 1Z
lk 2
xZ
h 1(yk 1)
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k exp[ f1tl1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(tlk 1   tlk 1)g]dtlk 1 : : : dt1
 
t2Z
1
: : :
tlk 1Z
lk 2
xZ
lk 1
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k exp[ f1t1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(x  tlk 1)g]dtlk 1 : : : dt1
=
t2Z
1
: : :
tlk 1Z
lk 2
1Z
h 1(yk 1)
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k exp[ f1tl1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(tlk 1   tlk 1)g]dtlk 1 : : : dt1
 
t2Z
1
: : :
tlk 1Z
lk 2
1Z
x
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k exp[ f1tl1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(tlk 1   tlk 1)g]dtlk 1 : : : dt1
 
t2Z
1
: : :
tlk 1Z
lk 2
xZ
lk 1
g11 : : : 
gk 1
k 1 
gk 1
k exp[ f1t1 +   + k 1(tlk 1   tlk 2) + k(x  tlk 1)g]dtlk 1 : : : dt1
= Blk 2
 
h 1(yk 1); 1; : : : ; lk 2
 Blk 2 (x; 1; : : : ; lk 2) Blk 1 (x; 1; : : : ; lk 1)
= Blk 2
 
h 1(yk 1); 1; : : : ; lk 2
 Blk 1 (x; 1; : : : ; lk 1) ; (16)
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noting h 1(yk 1) = lk 1, and
t2Z
1
: : :
tlkZ
lk 1
xZ
h 1(yk y)
g11 : : : 
gk
k exp[ f1tl1 + 2(tl2   tl1) +   + k(tlk   tlk 1)g]dtlk : : : dt1
=
t2Z
1
: : :
tlkZ
lk 1
1Z
h 1(ylk y)
g11 : : : 
gk
k exp[ f1tl1 + 2(tl2   tl1) +   + k(tlk   tlk 1)g]dtlk : : : dt1
 
t2Z
1
: : :
tlkZ
lk 1
1Z
x
g11 : : : 
gk
k exp[ f1tl1 + 2(tl2   tl1) +   + k(tlk   tlk 1)g]dtlk : : : dt1
= Blk 1
 
h 1(yk   y); 1; : : : ; lk 1
 Blk 1 (x; 1; : : : ; lk 1) : (17)
Substituting (16) and (17) into (14), formula (12) directly follows. Hence, the asserted result holds
true. 
Corollary B.2 When y = 0, the nite-time ruin probability given by Proposition B.1 coincides with
the results of Theorem 2.1 in Ignatov and Kaishev (2012b).
Proof: Following an analogous derivation as in Appendix A and noting lj(k)  k < lj(k)+1, where
lj(k) = g1 + : : :+ gj(k), the result directly follows. 
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